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Punitive Damages After Campbell: The Role of
Out-of-State Conduct
STEVEN

R.

HAMLIN,

J.D.*

INTRODUCTION

A three-year-old boy, left unattended for a moment, crawls into his
father's Ford truck, which has been parked in their sloped driveway.
The boy somehow knocks the gearshift into neutral, putting the weight
of the truck on a defective parking brake. The child falls out of the
truck, and is killed under its wheels as the defective parking brake
gives way and the truck rolls downhill.
The parents file suit in a Nevada court against Ford, alleging
defective design and failure to warn. There is ample evidence of similar nation-wide failures, including emotional testimony of a Pennsylvania mother whose child was injured in a similar roll-away
accident. The parents argue that Ford knew about the failures and
breached a duty to warn when they did not recall the truck for repairs.
Their attorney asks the jury to send a message to the manufacturer for its conduct nationwide: "Your verdict should vindicate the
interests of all Ford truck owners everywhere with a verdict that will
make the front page of every newspaper in the country, so that the
chief executive officer and other top officers of Ford Motor Company
will pour out of their chairs like water and crumple on the floor."
Plaintiffs' attorney introduces evidence of the number of trucks sold
nationwide, and asks the jury to calculate its award based on Ford's
nationwide conduct. The jury returns a verdict of $150 million in
punitive damages, and $2.3 million in compensatory damages.'
* Steven R. Hamlin is a 2002 graduate of Cornell Law School and is currently
practicing in Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank all those who assisted
in preparing this article, especially H. Ward Hamlin, Jr. for his invaluable
contribution.
1. The preceding fact pattern is adapted from White v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV-N95-0279-DWH, 2003 WL 23353600 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2003). The facts are drawn
from the case, however the preceding quotation is a composite. A case tried and
reversed before Campbell and which went to a second trial post-Campbell, White offers
a unique case study on Campbell's role in a large products liability action. I return to
an analysis of White in Section IV.
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Defense attorneys thought such trials were a thing of the past in
2
the wake of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,
and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. Campbell and Gore, they
argued, set dramatic limits on the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.4 Moreover, Campbell practically prohibited the
use of out-of-state evidence on the issue of punitive damages. 5 Plaintiffs' attorneys insisted that Campbell imposed only relaxed controls on
the use of out-of-state evidence and observed that the purported limits
on punitive damages were merely "guidelines," and their application
highly fact-specific. 6
Much has been written about the watershed nature of Campbell.
Few writers have examined in any detail what is perhaps Campbell's
most relevant holding for practitioners faced with a mass tort or bad
faith trial: the permissible use of out-of-state evidence. Campbell did
prohibit the use of lawful and unlawful out-of-state conduct to punish
the defendant. The Supreme Court was adamant that federalism prohibited a state from imposing punishment for extraterritorial conduct.7 The above attorney's request to "send a message" to Ford and
mete out punitive damages based on nation-wide conduct is clearly
prohibited.
Campbell holds, however, that out-of-state conduct may be used to
demonstrate deliberateness and culpability to bolster reprehensibility. 8
What did the Court mean by this? How can such evidence be used to
bolster reprehensibility, and therefore impose a higher punitive damages award, but not to punish? What if such evidence has dual use for
an underlying cause of action as well as punitive damages? Out-ofstate conduct permeates any mass tort or large bad faith case: failure to
warn invites examination of a defendant's notice of nationwide harm;
bad faith invites examination of a defendant's past conduct to negate
an "honest mistake" defense. In a case saturated with damaging outof-state conduct, how does a court ensure that a defendant is not punished unconstitutionally?
2. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
3. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
4. See, e.g., John T. Kolinski, Gore, Cooper Industries, and State Farm v.
Campbell: Game, Set, and Match for ExorbitantPunitive Damage Awards, FLA. B. J., Nov.

2003, at 34.
5. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
6. See, e.g., Larry S. Stewart, Constitutional Requirements for Punitive Damages:
Reality, Not Hyperbole - The Real Import of State Farm v. Campbell, FLA. B. J., Mar.
2003, at 34.
7. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422.

8. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss1/2

2

Hamlin: Punitive Damages after Campbell: The Role of Out-of-State Conduct

2005]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER CAMPBELL

This article examines the scope of out-of-state conduct that may
be used after Campbell. I begin Section I with a brief look at the evolution of the Court's holdings limiting punitive damages. In Section II, I
review Campbell, with particular attention to its holding with respect to
out-of-state conduct. I also examine the Court's excessiveness analysis, giving attention to the facts the Court considered relevant in determining the constitutionally permissible ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages. In Section III, I examine in greater detail the
permissible use of out-of-state conduct, beginning with the authority
underpinning the Court's permissive use of such conduct. I attempt to
reconcile the Court's historically permissive use with Campbell's holding prohibiting extraterritorial punishment and punishment for other
plaintiffs' claims not before the Court. Furthermore, in Section III C, I
argue that two limitations appear to flow from Campbell: (1) out-ofstate conduct should not be used to demonstrate recidivism, and (2)
conduct introduced to demonstrate deliberateness and culpability
must be acts upon which liability was premised. Typically such acts
will either have a causal relationship to plaintiffs harm, or be similar
to plaintiffs harm. In Section IV, I look at several cases applying
Campbell on the issue of out-of-state conduct; we see that courts struggle with Campbell's imprecise language, but generally arrive at reasonable solutions. Finally, in Section V, I will offer some observations
and recommendations for practitioners faced with a punitive damages
case involving nationwide conduct.
I.

THE COURT'S PRE-CAMPBELL PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW

Campbell marks the latest in a series of Supreme Court decisions
which limit punitive damages awards. The Supreme Court first indicated in a 1991 decision, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
that the Due Process Clause limited unreasonable punitive damages
awards. 9 Two years later, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., the Court reaffirmed the Due Process limitation, adding that a
court considering the permissible ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages could look not only to the actual damages but also consider
the potential harm that could have resulted from the defendant's
conduct. 1o

9. 499 U.S. 1, 18-19, 23 (1991) (noting that a four-to-one ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, which it upheld, "may be close to the line").
10. 509 U.S. 443, 460-61 (1993).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2005
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The Court finally struck down a punitive damages award in
Gore. 1 Gore marked a significant formalization of the Court's analysis. The Court reasoned that punitive damages awards must further a
legitimate state interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring
its repetition. 1 2 Due Process requires notice of the conduct for which
one will be punished as well as the severity of penalty.' 3 A punishment for unforeseen conduct or punishment that is unforeseeably large
goes beyond these interests and is an "arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.""
Gore created three "guideposts" to measure the constitutionality of
punitive damages awards. First, and "[p]erhaps the most important,"
courts examine the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, including whether the defendant was a recidivist.' 5 Second, courts look to
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.' 6 The Court
in Gore expressly refused to draw bright lines regarding the permissible ratio.' 7 Gore reaffirmed TXO's holding that a court may account
for potential harm in addition to actual compensatory damages.18 The
Court offered some guidance in reviewing ratios. Low compensatory
damages may support high punitive damages where a defendant's conduct was egregious. 19 Higher punitive damages may likewise be appropriate where "the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.

' 20

Gore's

third benchmark asked courts to compare punitive damages with civil
and criminal sanctions for the same conduct. 2 1 Courts should "accord
11. 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (vacating $4 million in punitive damages where $4,000 in
compensatory damages was awarded for selling a new car that had been repainted
without informing purchaser).
12. Id. at 568.
13. Id. at 574.
14. Id. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54).
15. Id. at 574-76. Gore did not well define how reprehensibility is determined.
The Court did not offer a rigid framework for analysis. It did offer several factors it
considered in concluding that the defendant's conduct was not particularly
reprehensible: violence, trickery and deceit rather than mere negligence; and
intentional malice. Id. at 575-76.
16. Id. at 575, 580-82.
17. Id. at 582-83.
18. Id. at 581.
19. Id. at 582 ("Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.").
20. Id.
21. Id.at 575, 583.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss1/2
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substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate
22
sanctions for the conduct at issue."
In its last pre-Campbell punitive damages decision, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the Court held that punitive
damages are reviewed under the de novo standard.2 3 Quoting Gore,
the Court reasoned: "Requiring the application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens
notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also helps to
assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that
24

is the essence of law itself."
II.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY V. CAMPBELL

Campbell was an action alleging bad-faith failure to settle. The
Campbells were sued for wrongful death and serious bodily injury
which resulted from Mr. Campbell's negligent attempt to pass six vehicles on a two-lane highway.2 5 Despite clear evidence of liability and
reasonable demands to settle within policy limits, the Campbells'
insurer - State Farm - refused to settle.2 6 State Farm doctored the

Campbells' file to make liability seem debatable, and insisted on taking the claim to trial.2 7 Despite State Farm's assurances to the
Campbells that their assets were safe, the trial resulted in a judgment
for $185,000 - well above the settlement offers and the Campbells'
policy limits. 28 State Farm refused to pay the excess, and advised the
Campbells to put "for sale" signs on their property. 29 The Campbells
then filed suit against State Farm.
At trial, plaintiffs introduced ample evidence of State Farm's corporate practices designed to reduce claims payoffs.3 0 Evidence of State
Farm's nationwide operations was introduced to demonstrate a pattern of fraud and bad faith.3 1 The jury returned a verdict of $145 million in punitive damages and $2.6 million in compensatory damages.
The trial court reduced this jury award to $25 million and $1 million,
22. Id.at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,

492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412-13 (2003).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 413, 433.

28. Id. at 413.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 414-15.
31. Id. at 415.
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respectively.3 2 However, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the original punitive damages award of $145 million, thereby resulting in a 1to-145 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.3 3
The Supreme Court in Campbell reaffirmed the principle driving
Gore's due process reasoning: A party must "receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose."3 4 Punitive damages are excessive when they go beyond a state's interests in deterrence
and retribution. 3 5 The Court found the $145 million in punitive damages, in light of $1 million in compensatory, violated State Farm's Due
Process rights and remanded.3 6
There is no doubt left after Campbell that the Court was serious
about imposing real limits on punitive damages: "Punitive damages are
a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the
potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for harm.

'3 7

The

Court was concerned that punitive damages - a quasi-criminal sanction - are imposed in the context of civil litigation where the protections afforded defendants are lower: "[D]efendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections
applicable in a criminal proceeding. ' 3' Guided by this cautionary
principle, the Court sought to impose clear limits on a state's interest
in the conduct to be punished, as well as the severity of the
punishment.
A.

Limitations on Punishable Conduct

The Court concluded that, rather than focusing on conduct occurring in Utah (the state in which the plaintiffs were injured), the case
"was used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country. ' 39 The Court
sought to clearly limit the scope of conduct for which State Farm could
be punished.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 417 (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574

(1996)).
35. Id. ("To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate
purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.").
36. Id. at 429.
37. Id. at 417 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 420.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss1/2
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General Prohibition of the Use of Out-of-State Conduct to
Demonstrate Reprehensibility

The Court in Campbell made two profound pronouncements generally excluding out-of-state evidence on the issue of punitive damages.4 ° First, "[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that
may have been lawful where it occurred."'" Second, "[n]or, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of
42
the State's jurisdiction.

This demarcation is rooted in federalist principles: "A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction. ' 4 3 The Court thus rejected evidentiary rulings which permitted
evidence of State Farm's out-of-state conduct; e.g., State Farm's nationwide claims handling practices.4 4
2.

Use of Out-of-State Conduct to Demonstrate Deliberatenessand
Culpability: The Nexus Requirement

Out-of-state conduct may be admitted to prove "deliberateness
and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious .... ,,45 However, the conduct "must have a nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff. ' 46 Jury instructions are required when
out-of-state conduct is admitted for this limited purpose: "[a] jury must
be instructed, furthermore, that it may not use evidence of out-of-state
conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the juris40. The Court in Gore did not reach the issue of extraterritorial punishment,
although the Court stated that a state has no legitimate interest in altering out-of-state
conduct. "We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity
that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent
of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
The Gore Court had no occasion to decide on extraterritorial punishment, as the
Alabama Supreme Court had expressly rejected punitive damages based on out-of-state
conduct in reducing punitive damages from $4 million to $2 million. Gore, 517 U.S. at
567 (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 628 (Ala. 1994)).
41. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 422.
44. Id. at 418-20.
45. Id. at 422.
46. Id.
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diction where it occurred."4 7 In light of its earlier pronouncement that
a state has no interest in punishing for out-of-state conduct. - lawful or
not - it is likely the Court would mandate a limiting instruction for
unlawful conduct as well.48
The Court did not clarify the scope of this new exception as
applied to the facts before it. It apparently concluded the out-of-state
evidence introduced, which plaintiffs argued was relevant to demonstrate State Farm's motive and means, did not have a sufficient nexus
to plaintiffs' harm.4 9 (The evidence demonstrated a company-wide
policy aimed at minimizing claims payouts, including preying on weak
claimants.5 ° ) The Court did not identify the specific out-of-state conduct it concluded "bore no relation to the Campbells' harm."'' 5

This

leaves unanswered the question of what the Court meant by "deliberateness and culpability" and the requisite nexus, which we will return
to in greater detail in Section 111.52

Apart from the vagueness of the requisite nexus requirement, a
paradox is apparent from the Court's holding: How can out-of-state
conduct be relevant under a reprehensibility analysis, the most important factor in measuring the permissible magnitude of punitive damages, 53 and yet not used to punish the defendant? Given the Court's
repeated concerns that punitive damages not be the product of "passion or prejudice" or intended to punish extraterritorial conduct,
should courts be vigilant in applying a probative value versus prejudi47. Id.
48. There is no sound reason to differentiate between lawful and unlawful out-ofstate conduct on this point. Both may be equally relevant to deliberateness and
culpability. A state may punish for neither, therefore, the required instruction remains
the same.
49. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422 (concluding plaintiffs' motive and method argument
"misses the mark" and then pronouncing the exception for out-of-state conduct to
prove deliberateness and culpability).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 436 (Ginsberg, J.,dissenting) (observing that State Farm's policies
and practices were responsible for plaintiffs' injuries and the "means used to
implement those policies could be found callous, clandestine, fraudulent, and
dishonest" (internal quotation marks omitted)). At first glance, it is difficult to
conceive how a policy used as an instrument to harm the plaintiffs is not relevant to
deliberateness and culpability. The Court's rejection of this evidence reveals the
gravity of the constitutional considerations, as I will discuss in greater detail below in
Section III.
53. Id. at 419 ("The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." (quoting
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss1/2
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cial danger analysis in admitting evidence of out-of-state conduct
under the exception? Courts have come to differing conclusions on
this question, as we will see in Section IV.
3.

Use of Other Acts to Demonstrate Recidivism: The Similarity
Requirement

After demarking evidentiary borders around the forum state, the
Campbell Court went further and held that only conduct similar to that
which harmed the plaintiff would be admissible to demonstrate reprehensibility by recidivism. 4 The Court stated that "courts must ensure
the conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions." The
Court found no such similar conduct was proven.5 5 Rather than showing similar bad-faith failures to settle third-party lawsuits, the plaintiffs
demonstrated only general claims-handling malfeasance.5 6 This was
insufficient: "The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to
expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for
any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year period. 5 7
Given this guidance, it remains unclear whether out-of-state conduct is relevant for purposes of recidivism. The Court does not identify any acts in Campbell that are relevant for recidivist purposes, so no
conclusions can be directly drawn. The Court's brief discussion of
recidivism focuses on the requirement that the "conduct in question
replicates the prior transgressions."5 8 Later the Court rejects the relevance of a $100 million out-of-state punitive damages award against
State Farm on the issue of reprehensibility because the Texas award
was a first-party action and therefore dissimilar.5 9 It is not clear
whether the Court would consider a similar third-party action Texas
award as relevant to deliberateness and culpability or recidivism.
Below I will posit that such an award would be admissible as deliberateness and culpability evidence. While such an award would also be
recidivist evidence in this case, we will see that evidence of recidivism
is not always the same as deliberateness and culpability evidence in all
cases.
The Court plainly holds that a state, as a general rule, does not
have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a
54. Id. at 423-24.
55. Id. at 423.
56. Id. at
57. Id. at
58. Id. at
59. Id. at

423-24.
424.
423.
426-27.
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defendant for out-of-state conduct. 60 Similar to the paradox identified
above, how can prior acts introduced for the purpose of demonstrating
recidivism (and therefore reprehensibility) serve as a basis to measure
the magnitude of punitive damages without punishing the defendant
for those acts?

B. Permissible Ratios of Punitive to Compensatory Damages and
Comparison to Civil and Criminal Penalties
The Supreme Court in Campbell declined to offer the Holy Grail
on the issue of permissible ratios: a bright line rule.6 1 From the
Court's decision, however, we can draw several principles, which
should prove adequate in most cases.
A single-digit ratio is the first benchmark, and quadruple damages
might be a firm stopping point in most cases. The Court stated that
"few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process
....

[A]n award of more than four times the amount of compensatory

damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. "62
Campbell held open the door cracked by Gore for larger ratios
where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages. 6 3 Conversely, Campbell swung the door both
ways to limit punitive damages to a ratio "perhaps only equal to compensatory damages" where compensatory damages are substantial.6 4

1. Factors Affecting PermissibleRatio
In deciding that the 145-to-i ratio in Campbell was unreasonable,
the Court considered several factors weighing in favor of a punitive
damages award "at or near the amount of compensatory damages. "65
First, the compensatory damages - $1 million - were substantial and

"complete compensation.

'6 6

Second, the Campbells' harm was eco-

60. Id. at 421.
61. Id. at 425 ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive
damages award cannot exceed.").
62. Id. The Court also cited Gore, which refers to a 700-year-old legislative history
supporting double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish. BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
63. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, "a higher ratio might be necessary where the
injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 426-29.
66. Id. at 426.
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nomic and did not involve physical assault or trauma.67 Third, the
Court noted State Farm's subsequent conduct: State Farm
paid the
68
excess verdict before the Campbells filed suit against it.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguing for tort practitioners, the
Court noted that the compensatory damages were already somewhat
punitive in nature.6 9 The Court observed that the Campbells' compensatory damages consisted primarily of emotional damages. 70 Damages
for emotional distress, the Court argued, already contain a punitive

67. Id. The Court instructed consideration as to whether "the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident." Id. at 419. The Court noted absence of all of these factors "renders any
award suspect." Id.
Numerous commentators and courts have slavishly bound their analysis to a
mechanical application of Campbell's and Gore's reprehensibility criteria, citing each
factor as a magic constitutional talisman. At times, the results can be absurd. See, e.g.,
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (claiming that Campbell added "intentional malice, trickery, or deceit" to the
mix of factors a court could consider), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004). It is an
ironic reflection of the state of the profession that lawyers (judges included) feel they
need the Supreme Court to tell them what makes conduct reprehensible. From a legal
realist perspective, it is instructive to examine the weight courts are giving the
Campbell/Gore factors. From a normative perspective, however, courts should not let
their analysis become a lifeless application of a laundry list of factors. The Supreme
Court is not the final arbiter of morality. It would be arrogant for the Court to so
assume. Moralists have struggled with reprehensibility for millennia. Reprehensibility
is within a jury's common experience. Courts and juries are independently well
equipped to define "wrongness" without mindless reference to a list of factors in a
Supreme Court decision. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
457 (1993) (rejecting a formalized comparative test much like the one adopted in Gore:
"[Punitive damages] awards are the product of numerous, and sometimes intangible,
factors; a jury imposing a punitive damages awards [sic] must make a qualitative
assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case
before it. Because no two cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such
awards are difficult to make."). In practice it would seem appellate courts are
deferential to juries' implicit qualitative judgment with regard to reprehensibility.
68. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426.
69. Id.
70. Id. Because State Farm had already paid the excess judgment, the Court
concluded that the Campbells "suffered only minor economic injuries for the 18month period in which State Farm refused to resolve the claim against them." The
Court stated that "[t]he compensatory damages for the injury suffered here ... likely
were based on a component which was duplicated in the punitive award." Id.
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element. 7 ' Therefore, given the punitive element present in an emotional damages award (which can often be substantial in the most serious tort cases), Campbell militates against a punitive damages award
greater than compensatory damages where substantial emotional
harm is compensated.
2.

Disfavored Factors: Factors Insufficient to Support an Award

The Court noted several factors which were insufficient to support
a large punitive damages award. The Court frowned upon references
to the low probability of detecting State Farm's bad conduct (which
would argue for a higher award in the rare case it was caught) as well
as reference to its assets. 72 A defendant's wealth is insufficient to justify "an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award. ' 73 The
Court reaffirmed its holding in Gore that proof of wealth to determine
punitive damages was not impermissible, but that "this factor cannot
make up for the failure of other factors ..

.

Among the disfavored factors the Court noted was comparison to
criminal sanctions under Gore's third guidepost - reference to penalties authorized in comparable cases. 75 Though relevant, criminal sanctions are poor benchmarks because their application is contemplated
only after a defendant is afforded the heightened protections of the
criminal process. 76 The Court cautioned, "[p]unitive damages are not
a substitute for the criminal process ...."177

71. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmt. C (1977) ("In many
cases in which compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such
as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant's act, there is no clear line of
demarcation between punishment and compensation and a verdict for a specified
amount frequently includes elements of both.")).
72. Id. at 427 (reasoning that these "had little to do with the actual harm sustained
by the Campbells").
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 428 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
76. Id. ("Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess
criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a
criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of
proof.").
77. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss1/2
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Punitive Damages May Not be Directly Based on Out-of-State
Conduct

One lesson is clear from Campbell: A jury may not use out-of-state
conduct to directly compute punitive damages. For example, a jury
may not be asked specifically to punish defendant's nationwide conduct. 78 Nor may a jury use nationwide evidence, such as sales or reve-

nue, as a multiplier in determining punitive damages.7 9

III.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: THE ROLE OF OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT

The Court held that out-of-state conduct may be admitted under
the first Gore guidepost - reprehensibility - to prove "deliberateness
and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious . . 80 The conduct "must have a nexus to the specific harm
suffered by the plaintiff."' Campbell also may have approved the use
of out-of-state conduct to demonstrate recidivism, also under the reprehensibility analysis, provided present conduct "replicates the prior
'
transgressions. "8
2

As questioned above, how can these holdings be squared with the
admonition that out-of-state conduct may not be used to punish the
defendant? Is reprehensibility not used to measure the proper punishment? May out-of-state conduct be used to demonstrate recidivism?
How can use of out-of-state conduct to demonstrate recidivism be reconciled with Campbell's holding that a defendant may not be punished
for out-of-state conduct, lawful or otherwise? There are no clear
answers, but an examination of the pedigree of the Court's permissive
approval of the use of out-of-state conduct and decisions applying
Campbell is instructive. Examining the Court's precedent on this issue
reveals a weak foundation for the argument that out-of-state conduct
should be used to demonstrate recidivism.
In light of the new nexus and similarity requirements in Campbell,
together with Campbell's strong federalism language, defense attorneys
have ammunition to exclude much out-of-state conduct as irrelevant or
cumulative and prejudicial. Further, in light of the facts of Campbell,
the nexus requirement considerably restricts the type of evidence
admissible on the issue of deliberateness and culpability. It appears
that to satisfy the nexus requirement, acts must either be causally
78. Id. at 422.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 423 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
n.28 (1993)).
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related to the plaintiffs harm or similar to the plaintiffs harm. 8 3 There
is some argument that similarity is not itself sufficient in all cases, and
the evidence must be causally related in certain types of actions (e.g.,
where intent is not an element of plaintiffs cause of action).
A.

Prior Punitive Damages Decisions and the Role of Out-of-State
Conduct
1.

Gore: Noting Relevance of Out-of-State Conduct, Citing TXO

Before Campbell, the Court opined several times on the use of outof-state conduct on the issue of punitive damages. Most recently, the
Court in Gore, relying on TXO, noted that out-of-state conduct "may be
relevant to the determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct. '8 4 Both Campbell and Gore cite TXO's note 28:
Campbell in support of its approval of recidivism evidence, provided
the conduct "replicates prior transgressions. "85
2.

TXO: Approving Use of Out-of-State Conduct, Citing Haslip

In TXO's note 28, the Court approved the use of out-of-state conduct to assess punitive damages.8 6 The Court dismissed via footnote
several errors assigned by TXO, including the use of out-of-state evidence: "TXO also contends that the admission of evidence of its
alleged wrongdoing in other parts of the country, as well as the evidence of its impressive net worth, led the jury to base its award on
impermissible passion and prejudice."' The Court cited Haslip in
support of'its conclusion that all of these factors were properly considered under "well-settled law," but the Court's reliance was misplaced. 88
Out-of-state conduct factored into the TXO Court's approval of
punitive damages. The Supreme Court in TXO reasoned that punitive
damages were justified, in part, because "the scheme employed in this
case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and
83. Because prior decisions do not recognize a distinction between "deliberateness
and culpability" and "recidivism," the survey below of Supreme Court decisions treats
them together.
84. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 n.21 (1996) (citing
TXO, 509 U.S. at 462, n.28).
85. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423.
86. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 n.28.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)
(approving consideration of the Alabama court's reprehensibility criteria, including
examination of "the existence and frequency of similar past conduct ... [and] the
'financial position' of the defendant")).
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[because of] petitioner's wealth."8 9 However, Haslip provides no
authority for the use of out-of-state conduct because no such conduct
was involved. Further, the defendant in TXO did not argue that federalism should exclude out-of-state evidence, but rather that such evidence ought to have been excluded as impermissible character
evidence. 90
3.

Haslip: No Out-of-State Conduct Admitted on Punitive Damages

Haslip approved the Alabama Supreme Court's review of punitive
damages, which used criteria including "the existence and frequency
of similar past conduct." Haslip did not approve the use of prior similar out-of-state conduct. 9 ' A brief examination of the facts is in order.
The plaintiffs in Haslipwere city employees. 92 Pacific Mutual arranged
for Union, a group health insurer, to provide city employees with
group health insurance. 93 The premiums were paid to Pacific Mutual
through defendant Ruffin, who misappropriated most of the payments. 94 Upon non-receipt of premiums, Union sent notices of lapsed
health coverage to plaintiffs in care of Ruffin. Unsurprisingly, Ruffin
never forwarded the notices.9 5 When Plaintiff Haslip was hospitalized,
her coverage was denied, and consequently she could not pay her
bill.96 The bill was sent to collection, damaging her credit. 97 At trial
against Pacific Mutual, a substantial general verdict was awarded,
which the trial court found included a significant punitive damages
component. 9 8 The Supreme Court held that Pacific Mutual was liable
for Ruffin's actions under Alabama law, noting that Pacific Mutual had
notice that Ruffin had engaged in a prior pattern of fraud.9 9 All relevant acts occurred in Alabama.' 0 0
Plaintiffs in Haslip never introduced evidence of out-of-state conduct to bolster reprehensibility or to demonstrate recidivism. Haslip
was a case of a discrete act of misappropriation, although prior acts
were relevant to demonstrate that Pacific Mutual had notice of Ruffin's
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 465.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 4-5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 4-5.
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habit of fraud. There was no indication that any of these prior acts
took place outside Alabama.
Recall that Haslip was the first case in which the Court scrutinized
the constitutionality of punitive damages. A case involving no out-ofstate conduct, therefore, appears to be the progenitor of the doctrine
purporting to permit use of out-of-state conduct in a due process
review of punitive damages.

4.

TXO revisited: The Out-of-State Conduct and Defendant's
Objections

The Court in TXO did not discuss the sort of out-of-state conduct
it permitted as a result of its footnote holding. One must look to the
West Virginia Supreme Court's decision to see that, analyzed in light of
Campbell, most of this out-of-state conduct would not be relevant to
punitive damages. The out-of-state conduct, however, may have been
relevant to plaintiffs underlying cause of action. TXO foreshadowed
the post-Campbell problem that arises when out-of-state conduct is relevant to a plaintiffs cause of action, but has little bearing on the issue
of punitive damages.
In TXO, Alliance sold oil and gas rights in valuable mineral-rich
West Virginia land to TXO in exchange for cash and royalties.' 1 Alliance promised to return consideration to TXO if TXO's attorney determined that "title had failed."' 2 TXO subsequently discovered that
Alliance's predecessor in interest had transferred coal rights to a third
party.'" 3 TXO knew that the oil and gas rights transferred to it from
Alliance were not affected by this prior transaction.'0 4 The coal rights
previously sold were transferred several times. 10 5 Upon learning of
the previously assigned rights, TXO purchased them via a quitclaim
deed and filed it without telling Alliance.' 0 6 TXO also unsuccessfully
attempted to get one of the intermediate purchasing parties to sign an
affidavit saying the original transfer of coal rights might have included
10 7
oil and gas rights.
TXO then wrote to Alliance, indicating that there may be a cloud
on the title, and that it had purchased oil and gas rights in the prop101. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1993).

102. Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 448.
Id. at 448-49.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
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erty from a third party.'
TXO knew it had purchased no such rights.
Under this cloud of false doubt, TXO attempted to renegotiate Alliance's royalties under the original agreement. 10 9 When Alliance
rejected these overtures, TXO brought a declaratory judgment action to
clear title to the property." 0 Alliance filed a counter-claim alleging
that TXO's claim was frivolous and brought to slander Alliance's
title. '''
Alliance introduced at trial videotaped depositions of attorneys
involved in other disputes with TXO. 1 12 TXO's prior bad acts were
extensive. Alliance introduced evidence that TXO exerted pressure on
a functionally illiterate Louisiana woman to sign over her mineral
rights." 3 TXO had also refused to pay royalties due to a Texas partnership, falsely asserting doubts about the title. 1 4 TXO under-reported
gas extracted from another Texas well and paid only minimal shut-in
royalties to another Texas businessman, even though the wells were
producing normally. 1 1 5 An Oklahoma attorney testified about a
scheme whereby TXO acquired interest in Oklahoma land through
fraud and misrepresentation. 1 1 6 This attorney also testified about a
pending case, vaguely alleging that TXO had violated the rights of
"hundreds or thousands of other people across the nation, as a result
17
of this willful, wanton action."'
TXO's objection to this out-of-state conduct was based on the
West Virginia rules of evidence and not founded on federalist principles." 8 TXO argued that these prior bad acts were inadmissible character evidence." 9 The West Virginia court rejected TXO's argument,
holding that these acts were relevant to prove TXO's malice, an element
of Alliance's slander of title claim. 120 The evidence, the court rea108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 881 (W. Va. 1992).
113. Id. at 881-82.
114. Id. at 882.
115. Id. Shut-in royalties are minimal royalties paid even when a well is not
producing.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 882-83.
118. Id. at 883.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 884.
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soned, negated TXO's defense that its dispute with Alliance was merely
12 1
a good-faith mistake.

The dispute in this pre-Campbell case did not focus on Campbell's
federalist implications, but rather on an evidentiary principle whether out-of-state character evidence was relevant to an issue other
than punitive damages. 1 22 Nonetheless, out-of-state conduct was considered.on the issue of punitive damages. 1 23 In applying West Virginia
law on the issue of whether punitive damages bore a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, the West Virginia court noted that
the punitive damages were necessary because of TXO's out-of-state
conduct: "[An award of this magnitude is necessary to discourage
TXO from continuing its pattern and practice of fraud, trickery and
deceit.'

1' 24

If TXO were decided in the wake of Campbell, almost none of the
out-of-state conduct the courts allowed would be admissible on the
issue of reprehensibility. Applying the recidivism standard, the only
act which might be permitted is the case in which TXO raised doubts
about the title in the Texas property in order to avoid paying royalties. 1 25 Applying Campbell's exception permitting out-of-state conduct
on the issues of deliberateness and culpability, none of the out-of-state
conduct in TXO had a sufficient nexus to Alliance's harm.' 2 6 This
insufficient nexus is evident from an examination of the conduct in
Campbell, which the Court concluded "bore no relation to the
12 7
Campbells' harm."'

B.

The Court's Uncertain Holding on Relevant Out-of-State Conduct:
Applying Campbell to Campbell, TXO, and Gore.

One would think that by looking at the out-of-state conduct the
Court considered relevant in Campbell, we could gain insight into the
type of conduct permitted under the "deliberateness and culpability"
and recidivism exceptions. Campbell does not provide such easy guidance. Rather, Campbell summarily concluded that the trial was used
to punish State Farm for its nation-wide conduct.
121. Id. at 883-84.
122. Id. at 883.
123. Id. at 889-90.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 882. Campbell is unclear as to whether out-of-state conduct is permitted
to demonstrate recidivism, however.
126. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
127. Id.
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In Campbell, plaintiffs introduced evidence of State Farm's "Performance, Planning and Review" policy, which plaintiffs argued
embodied a company-wide scheme to "meet corporate fiscal goals by
capping payouts on claims company-wide.' 128 Plaintiffs introduced
copious evidence of an extensive practice of falsifying files, attacking
claimants' character, and exerting corporate pressure on adjusters to
reduce payments. 1 29 Plaintiffs also introduced evidence of an "Excess
Liability Handbook," which the State Farm adjusters relied upon in
their treatment of the plaintiffs' case. 130 The handbook instructed
employees to pad files with self-serving documents and to omit other
items, such as evaluations of insured's exposure.13 ' Several former
employees testified to a State Farm policy of:
[Attacking] the weakest of the herd ...the elderly, the poor, and other
consumers who are least knowledgeable about their rights and thus
most vulnerable to trickery or deceit, or who have little money and
hence have no real alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to set13 2
tle a claim at much less than fair value.
The Court did not identify what conduct it considered relevant,
but emphasized that in this case "[tlhe courts awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the
Campbells' harm. A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for
punitive damages."'1 3 3 Apparently third-party lawsuits were the gold
standard the Court sought: "the Utah court erred here because evidence pertaining to claims that had nothing to do with a third-party
1 34
lawsuit was introduced at length.'
In holding that State Farm's conduct merited some measure of
punitive damages, the Court cited only conduct which proximately
affected the plaintiffs: State Farm altered company records to make the
Campbells less culpable (falsely bolstering a claim that it could defend
the lawsuit and need not settle); disregarded the high likelihood of liability and near-certain probability of a judgment in excess of policy
limits; and falsely assured the plaintiffs their assets were safe, only to
later tell them post-judgment that they should put a "for sale" sign on
128. Id. at 415.

129. Id. at 432-33.
130. Id. at 433.
131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id. at 422.
134. Id. at 423-24.
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their house. 135 All of this conduct bore a causal nexus to plaintiffs'
harm. 136 Implicit in the Court's analysis is that the balance of the outof-state conduct was not probative on the issue of deliberateness and
culpability. 137
In TXO the trial court rejected TXO's argument that it had goodfaith doubts about whether the title it acquired from Alliance conveyed
rights to oil and gas. 138 Holding the deeds to be clear and unambiguous, the court granted summary judgment to Alliance dismissing
TXO's claim to clear title in its favor. 139 The court nonetheless let a
jury decide Alliance's claim for slander of title. 140 This claim required
proof of malice and forced Alliance to negate TXO's good-faith
defense. 14 ' Applying Campbell, this out-of-state conduct could be
instruction prohibiting its use on
admitted in TXO only with a limiting
42
the issue of punitive damages.'

This evidence, however, might not be admissible under Campbell.
The Court in Campbell seemed content to award punitive damages
1 43
based solely on the conduct that proximately affected the plaintiffs.
Under this reasoning, the plaintiff in TXO could likewise have demonstrated liability and entitlement to punitive damages based solely on
TXO's conduct with respect to the property at issue. Reference to outof-state conduct is cumulative: it does not further negate an honest
mistake, and only serves to invite punishment for other out-of-state
acts. 144
Returning to the out-of-state conduct considered in Gore, there the
plaintiff argued that his harm was part of the defendant's "nationwide
pattern of tortious conduct.' 1

45

The Court approved admission of

recidivist conduct in principle: repeatedly engaging in conduct that a
defendant knows is illegal justifies a more severe punishment. 146 The
Court stated, "Our holdings that a recidivist may be punished more
severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 419-20.
Id.
Id. at 422-23.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1993).
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 423.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996).
Id. at 576-77.
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more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance. "147
The Court found, however, that the law governing the defendant's conduct was unclear: many states permitted defendant's conduct of
repainting cars damaged in manufacture or transit, and selling them as
new when the cost of repair was less than three percent of the suggested retail price. 4 8 Therefore, the evidence failed to support recidivism because the defendant did not have notice that the conduct was
illegal. 14 9
Gore emphasized the now-familiar precept that out-of-state conduct may not be used to punish. The Court agreed with the Alabama
Supreme Court's conclusion that it would be error to use out-of-state
conduct as a multiplier in determining punitive damages. 150 Nonetheless, the Gore Court failed to reconcile this prohibition with its
acknowledgement that such conduct may 15be1 useful in determining
reprehensibility, and therefore punishment.
C.

Reconciling Campbell with Precedent: Rationalizing a Doctrine
Permitting Out-of-State Conduct

The Campbell Court never explains how out-of-state conduct can
enhance reprehensibility and support larger punitive damages while
not punishing the defendant for such out-of-state conduct.' 52 To
rationalize such a position, one must consider the twin purposes of
punitive damages: deterrence and retribution. 1 53 It is clear that retribution, which in this sense appears to be synonymous with punish54
ment, is not legitimately served by considering out-of-state conduct. 1
Deterrence, however, arguably is distinct from punishment, and may
justify the use of out-of-state conduct.
While out-of-state conduct may be relevant to deterrence, constitutional considerations drastically restrict the manner in which punitive
damages can further a state's interest in deterrence. 1 5 5 For example,
absurdly large punitive damages, while serving to deter the defendant,
1 56
are prohibited by the Due Process Clause.
147. Id. at 577.
148. Id. at 577-78.
149. Id. at 578-79.
150. Id. at 574 n.21.
151. Id.
152. Indeed, the Court does not specifically hold that out-of-state conduct may be
permitted to demonstrate recidivism.
153. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
154. Id. at 421-22.
155. Id. at 416-17.
156. Id.
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The Constitution limits a state's power to further deterrence in
other ways. A state may not mete out punitive damages with the intent
of regulating conduct in other states. 15 7 As the Court stated in Gore:
"We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and
comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of
its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in
'
other [s]tates. 158
59
A state has an interest in deterring conduct within its borders.
This of course includes specific deterrence with respect to the defendant. Specific deterrence invites examination of the defendant's past
conduct: a defendant who has done it before is more likely to do it
again. A higher punitive award may be necessary to deter a recidivist.
While the Court in Gore does not discuss specific deterrence, it compares the permissive use of recidivist acts to a criminal court's examination of a defendant's past conduct, including lawful conduct, in
enhancing a sentence. 160 The Court expressly denies that using prior
acts in this way constitutes punishment for prior acts.16 1 Therefore,
when the Court speaks about prior acts used to bolster reprehensibility, it may be aiming at their relevance to specific deterrence.
Unfortunately the unrestrained implications of this rationalization are not harmonious with the Court's holding in Campbell. Under
this rationalization, all of a defendant's past acts that bear on the likelihood of the defendant repeating the conduct would be relevant. A
defendant with a history of intentionally tortious behavior, regardless
of the similarity of that behavior to plaintiffs harm, is more likely to
repeat the conduct that harmed plaintiff. A criminal court has wide
1 62
latitude to consider these acts.
Campbell restricts this latitude considerably.' 6 3 If offered to
demonstrate recidivism, prior acts must replicate the conduct at
issue."' This restriction is motivated by concerns that the defendant
not be subjected to punishment for all its misdeeds in one trial, and
1 65
punished multiple times for a single misdeed in multiple trials.
157. See id.; BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).

158. Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
159. Id. at 568.
160. Id. at 573.
161. Id. at 573 n.19.

162. Id.
163. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 (2003).

164. Id.
165. Id. at 423 ("Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a
defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis . . . Punishment on these
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This restriction is, essentially, an arbitrary line. The line fully vindicates neither the state's interest in deterrence, nor a defendant's right
to be free from defending prior unrelated misdeeds. The "replicate"
requirement is a rigid line, which might not best serve deterrence in all
cases. One could imagine a case in which a defendant has engaged in
particularly egregious prior acts, which indicate a high likelihood of
recidivism but do not replicate the conduct at issue, and do not pose a
significant threat of liability. In this case the balance of interests favors
admission of the prior dissimilar acts. Under Campbell, there is no
latitude to mete out punitive damages based on such dissimilar acts,
regardless of their relevance to deterrence. 16 6 The rigid nature of the
"replicate" requirement underscores the Court's sensitivity to protecting defendants against excessive or duplicative punishment.
We see a similar purposive limitation on the use of out-of-state
evidence to demonstrate deliberateness and culpability: the prior acts
must have a "nexus" to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. 16 7 This limitation is motivated by the same concerns limiting recidivist evidence to
similar harm: precluding punishment for other acts. 1 68 It is also motivated by federalist concerns limiting a state's legitimate penal interest. 1 69 These principles, taken together, support the conclusion that
out-of-state evidence should not be used to demonstrate recidivism.
1.

Out-of-State Conduct Should Not Be Used To Demonstrate
Recidivism

There is some indication the Court would exclude out-of-state
conduct for the purpose of demonstrating recidivism.' 7 ° Federalism
and a general sense of fairness and judicial efficiency appear to outweigh deterrence. 17 1 The line the Campbell Court draws with respect
to limiting recidivist evidence to conduct similar to that which injured
the plaintiff is arbitrary. This line is motivated by the overarching
principles of federalism and due process in general, which limit punitive damages such that they further state interests and do not subject a
defendant to over-punishment. 7' 2 Under the same reasoning justifying
bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct
. . . .1).
166. Id. at 422.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
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the similarity requirement, out-of-state conduct should not be permitted to demonstrate recidivism.
It could be argued that proof of recidivism is relevant to culpability: out-of-state conduct evincing recidivism should be permitted
under the Court's express exception permitting out-of-state evidence
on the issue of deliberateness and culpability. Culpability is typically
associated with the level of guilt on a spectrum of negligent, reckless,
knowing, or purposeful.' 7 3 It is derived from the Latin "culpa," which
means neglect or negligence. 1 74 It is synonymous with a defendant's
state of mind or level of intent. In this sense, recidivist acts do not
necessarily relate to a defendant's state of mind (e.g., negligence,
recklessness).
Campbell did not hold any conduct at issue - out-of-state or not relevant to the issue of recidivism. 175 Campbell is therefore not controlling authority with respect to out-of-state conduct offered to demonstrate recidivism. The Court's separate treatment of culpability and
recidivism in its discussion indicates that the two concepts were distinct to the Court. After pronouncing the nexus requirement with
respect to out-of-state conduct offered on the issue of deliberateness
and culpability (and emphasizing that federalism requires that the
award not serve as punishment for out-of-state conduct), the Court
concludes that the fundamental error was the dissimilarity of State
Farm's bad acts from the specific acts that harmed the Campbells. 1 76
Only then does it turn to recidivism, finding that recidivism was not
established for the same reason: because the prior conduct did not
1 77
replicate the conduct at issue.
To be sure, there is often a great deal of similarity between deliberateness and culpability evidence and recidivist evidence. Out-of-state
conduct that satisfies Campbell's "replicate" recidivism requirement
may also satisfy Campbell's nexus requirement and relate to deliberate173. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 406 (8th ed. 2004).
174. Id.
175. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426-27. The Court, in its rejection of a $100 million
Texas punitive damages award against State Farm, premised on dissimilarity of that
case (a first party action, not a third party action as in Campbell), states that a similar
out-of-state award would be relevant under the reprehensibility analysis. The Court
does not clarify whether that evidence would relate to deliberateness and culpability
or recidivism. In this case it clearly would be both. Therefore, the Court is not
holding that a similar Texas award would be admissible as out-of-state recidivist
evidence. We will see below that recidivist evidence may not always relate to
deliberateness and culpability.
176. Id. at 422.
177. Id. at 423.
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ness and culpability. In such circumstances, the out-of-state conduct
is expressly admissible under Campbell.17 8 Recidivist evidence, however, does not necessarily relate to deliberateness or culpability, as we
see below in Section III C (2) and (3).
Even if a court chose not to extend Campbell's reasoning to preclude the use of out-of-state conduct to demonstrate recidivism, these
concerns argue in favor of a highly cautious treatment of such evidence. Where possible, the prejudicial impact of the evidence should
be mitigated by jury instructions, permissive stipulation, and the
exclusion of inflammatory testimony as more prejudicial than
probative.
a. Federalism Militates Against Use of Out-of-State Conduct to
Demonstrate Recidivism
As discussed above, the Court in Campbell was emphatic that a
state has no legitimate interest in punishing a defendant for its out-ofstate conduct. 1 79 A civil trial may not be used to excoriate a defendant
for its nationwide activities." 8
Campbell's holding that out-of-state conduct can be used to determine the appropriate level of punitive damages, yet may not be used to
punish, is absurd. There is always the risk of punishment based on
out-of-state conduct. A jury faced with numerous similar out-of-state
acts introduced to demonstrate recidivism cannot help but be tempted
to punish a defendant for those acts. To ask a jury to weed out the
"punishment" from the "enhancement" is to ask the impossible. A
punishment by any other name (e.g. "enhancement") would still be
punishment.""
In light of the Court's unambiguous language on the issue of federalism, due deference to this risk argues against admitting out-of-state
conduct to demonstrate recidivism. If a defendant's conduct is truly
pervasive and nationwide, then there should be sufficient intra-state
178. Id. at 422-23.
179. Id. at 421 ("Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside
of the State's jurisdiction."); accord BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 572 (1996) ("We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and
comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with
the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States.").
180. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
181. It is difficult to conceive of adequate instructions on the fine distinction
between enhancement versus punishment (if, indeed, there is a distinction). One can
almost hear jurors changing mental channels as a judge drones on about federalism
and specific deterrence versus retribution.
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conduct to demonstrate recidivism. Therefore, in the worst case of
recidivism, little is lost by excluding out-of-state conduct.
b.

Risk of Duplicate Punishment Militates Against Use of Out-ofState Conduct to Demonstrate Recidivism

Due process considerations prohibit adjudication of other parties'
claims in a punitive damages trial. 18 2 As the Court stated in Campbell,
"Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis
... . Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple
punitive damages awards for the same conduct ....

A single case

is not the proper vehicle by which a defendant is tried for all its out-ofstate torts: "Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside
Utah to other persons would require their inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need to apply the laws of
their relevant jurisdiction." 8 4
The risk of "multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct" was a factor the Court cited in justifying its limitation of evidence on the issue of deliberateness and culpability to only conduct
which had a nexus to plaintiffs specific harm. 18 5 The Court accepts
this risk in permitting any evidence of recidivism: each bad-faith failure to settle a third-party lawsuit could, theoretically, be used ad infinitum to enhance punitive damages against a defendant. This risk is
greatly amplified when out-of-state conduct is permitted to demonstrate recidivism.
The Court did not expressly accept the risk that a defendant may
be punished multiple times for out-of-state conduct. In fact, the Court
rejected any "punishment" for out-of-state conduct. 1 86 Out-of-state
conduct can only be permitted to demonstrate recidivism, and therefore enhance punitive damages, under the absurd argument that
enhancement is not punishment. 18 7 The risk of duplicative punishment is greatly avoided by not permitting out-of-state conduct to
demonstrate recidivism.
182. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421-23.
183. Id. at 423.
184. Id. at 421-22.
185. Id. at 422-23.
186. id.
187. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 (1996) (reasoning
that using prior acts to enhance penalty does not constitute punishment for prior
acts).
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Requisite Nexus: Out-of-State Conduct Offered to Demonstrate
Deliberateness and Culpability Must Be Acts upon Which
Liability Was Premised

As discussed in Section III B, above, Campbell implies that out-ofstate conduct must be causally related to plaintiff's injury to satisfy the
nexus requirement of the deliberateness and culpability exception. All
of the conduct cited by the Court in support of its conclusion that
State Farm's conduct "merits no praise" was causally related to the
Campbells' harm.

18 8

Campbell's language indicates a causal or similarity requirement. 189 After pronouncing the rule excluding out-of-state evidence
and the exception for deliberateness and culpability, the Court concluded that the "fundamental reason" the Utah courts erred was that
the punitive damages were awarded to punish and deter "conduct that
bore no relation to the Campbells' harm." 190 The Court continued:
"[a] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which
liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed
19 1
the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business."'
The out-of-state conduct must be part of the basis upon which
liability was premised.' 9 2 Causal conduct clearly fits this definition.
Also, where notice is an element of plaintiffs claim, similar out-of-state
conduct may provide the requisite notice in some cases.
A products liability case is a good illustration of both these principles. In a failure to warn products liability case, out-of-state conduct is
offered to demonstrate a defendant's notice of product defect. With
respect to defect, similarity is required in order for our-of-state conduct
to be relevant to plaintiffs underlying claim. Notice of dissimilar
defect does not have the requisite nexus because it is "independent
from the acts upon which liability is premised."' 93 Therefore, the out188. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419. State Farm altered company records to make
plaintiff less culpable (falsely bolstering a claim that it could defend the lawsuit and
need not settle); disregarded the high likelihood of liability and near-certain
probability of a judgment in excess of policy limits; and falsely assured the plaintiffs
their assets were safe, only to later tell them post-judgment that they should put a "for
sale" sign on their house. Id.
189. Id. at 422.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 422-23.
192. Id. at 422. Out-of-state conduct must not be "independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised."
193. Id.
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of-state conduct has both a causal relationship and a similarity
relationship.
With respect to bad faith, the application of this standard is less
clear. TXO, without much discussion, permitted dissimilar acts to
demonstrate bad faith.' 94 Campbell states that "[a] defendant's dissiml
It
ilar acts. . . may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. '' 19
qualifies this dissimilar act prohibition, however: the Court notes that
only dissimilar acts "independent from the acts upon which liability
was premised may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. "196
Acts that form the basis of liability, such as the dissimilar acts in TXO
and even in Campbell, arguably bear a sufficient nexus to the specific
harm in that they negate an "honest mistake" defense.' 9 7 But, as we
have seen, the Court in Campbell analyzed State Farm's acts under a
very narrow definition of similarity.
Under the same reasoning in which I argue that out-of-state conduct should not be used to demonstrate recidivism, dissimilar acts
should not be, and indeed were not, permitted to form the basis of
punitive damages. It is one thing to say that a defendant's "honest
mistake" defense is negated by a history of conduct, and quite another
to say that the bad faith at issue is made more reprehensible by a history of unsavory business dealings. The risk of punishment for prior
acts is evident. Campbell was rife with out-of-state conduct which was
arguably relevant to negate a mistake defense to a bad faith claim. But
the Court rejected the relevance of this conduct, which it held to be
98
dissimilar, to the issue of punitive damages.1
Overlaying a requirement that admissible acts must be those
which form the basis of liability serves to narrow the scope of conduct
to that bearing a close nexus to plaintiffs harm. Campbell also held
that out-of-state conduct, if not causally related, must be similar to
plaintiffs harm. 19 9 Notice, in the case of products liability, is satisfied
logically only by similar defects. In the case of bad faith actions, considerations against punishment for all of a defendant's misdeeds weigh
against admission of dissimilar conduct.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993).
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422.
Id.
Id. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 419.
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Deliberateness and Culpability Versus Recidivism

Acts which satisfy the "replicates" requirement of recidivism will
satisfy the nexus requirement of deliberateness and culpability in
many punitive damages cases. We have seen above how this is true in
products liability cases and bad faith actions. In some cases prior similar acts do not necessarily bear on deliberateness and culpability.
Where notice or lack of mistake is not an issue, identical past conduct
may not bear on the deliberateness of the defendant's conduct. Typically such cases, e.g., negligence, are not where one would expect punitive damages. Some such actions are ripe for punitive damages,
though.
In a defamation action, for example, a defendant's past defamations do not relate to the basis upon which liability was premised. A
plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known the
defamatory statement was false. Whether a defendant has defamed in
the past has little relevance to this inquiry (and would be inadmissible
character evidence). Unlike in Campbell, where prior bad-faith failure
to settle claims may have shown a deliberate plan to gamble with plaintiffs excess exposure, 200 a defendant's similar prior defamations do
not necessarily reveal a deliberate scheme to defame. Such prior
defamatory statements would be evidence of recidivism, but not relate
to deliberateness and culpability.
Similarly, in a DWI case prior offenses may bolster recidivism but
do not necessarily demonstrate deliberateness or culpability. A defendant does not act more deliberately or culpably by getting intoxicated
and operating a car by virtue of the fact that he has done so previously.
The deliberateness and culpability of a defendant's actions in that case
are measured by the defendant's state of mind when he commits the
act of DWI that injures the plaintiff. The defendant's prior acts of DWI
are irrelevant to this analysis.
IV.

CASES APPLYING CAMPBELL ON THE USE OF
OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT

As indicated above, some lessons from Campbell are clear and
some are not. A jury cannot be asked to send a message, nor compute
punitive damages directly based on out-of-state conduct. Campbell creates difficulties when out-of-state conduct is relevant to a plaintiffs
case in chief and offered on the issue of punitive damages.
200. Id. at 413.
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Cases Holding Out-of-State Conduct May Not Be Used to Punish
Defendant

Several cases have reversed punitive damages awards because they
were based on out-of-state conduct. Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith followed remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of
Campbell.2 ° 1 On remand, the court vacated punitive damages because
the jury was not instructed that it could not punish the defendant for
argued that the defenout-of-state conduct.2" 2 At trial, the plaintiff 2had
0 3
dant should be punished for such conduct.

In Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., $20 million in "sanctions"
against a tobacco company was awarded to California for the tobacco
company's violation of a settlement agreement by targeting advertising
to youth.20 4 The court held that punitive damages law was instructive,
and the trial court's $20 million sanctions had been impermissibly
based on national advertising budget and revenues, rather than conduct in California.20 5
B.

Cases Admitting Out-of-State Conduct

Several cases are illustrative of the permissible role of out-of-state
conduct in light of Campbell.
1.

Out-of-State Conduct with Causal Relationship Admissible

In a recent decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court demonstrated the difficulty courts have in deciding cases under Campbell. In
Boyd v. Goffoli, the court permitted evidence of out-of-state conduct to
support punitive damages. 20 6 The defendants induced plaintiffs, West
Virginians, to quit their jobs and become truck drivers for defendant
Falcon Transport. 20 7 The defendants instructed plaintiffs to take a certification course in Pennsylvania and represent to Pennsylvania authorities that they were Pennsylvania residents so they could obtain in-state
drivers' licenses. 20 8 The plaintiffs questioned the legality of this plan,
but the defendants represented that it was legal and commonly
201.
202.
203.
204.
LEXIS
205.
206.
207.
208.

142 S.W.3d 153, 164-66 (Ky. 2004).
Id.
Id.
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petitionfor review denied, 2004 Cal.
5444 (June 9, 2004).
Id. at 345-48.
608 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 2004).
Id. at 175.
Id.
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done. 20 9 The Pennsylvania authorities discovered this fraud and
detained the plaintiffs, but did not file charges.2 1 Plaintiffs thereafter
refused to complete the certification process and filed suit.2 1 ' The jury
returned a verdict of $75,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000
in punitive damages for each plaintiff.2 12 On appeal, the court rejected
defendants' argument that out-of-state conduct - the Pennsylvania
2 13
fraud - was improperly used to punish in violation of Campbell.
The court distinguished its facts from Campbell, observing that the
2 14
out-of-state conduct at issue was causally related to plaintiffs' harm.
The Boyd court's reasoning can best be described as odd: it characterized as dictum Campbell's language that a state has no legitimate
interest in punishing unlawful out-of-state conduct. 215 The Boyd court
held that a state has a legitimate interest in punishing defendants for
unlawful out-of-state conduct where the punishing state "has a legitimate interest in imposing damages to punish a defendant for unlawful
acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction where the State has a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the plain2 16
tiffs' claims which arise from the unlawful out-of-state conduct.
This is an odd gloss on Campbell's strong out-of-state conduct
punishment prohibition - one the Boyd court need not have made.
The court was wrong in its characterization of the facts in Campbell:
the out-of-state conduct there at issue was not all unlawful. Campbell's
holding on that point was not dicta.2 1 7 Had Boyd applied Campbell's
out-of-state conduct exception - that such conduct may be relevant to
prove deliberateness and culpability - it need not have made its own
nexus-based holding. In doing so, Boyd simply restated the holding of
Campbell. Clearly, the jury needed to hear about the Pennsylvania
fraud. The scheme makes no sense if plaintiffs' evidence is limited to a
curt explanation that "defendants made us go somewhere to do some
209. Id.
210. Id. at 175-76.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 178.
214. Id.
215. Id. ("Further, this Court does not believe that the Campbell Court's broadly
worded dictum that a state does not have a legitimate concern imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant's unlawful out-of-state conduct applies to the instant
case.").
216. Id. at 179.
217. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) ("Here,
the Campbells do not dispute that much of the out-of-state conduct was lawful where it
occurred.") (emphasis added).
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stuff and it went pretty bad." The out-of-state evidence went directly to
plaintiffs' underlying cause of action, and the Pennsylvania fraud made
defendants' conduct reprehensible in the first place.
Similarly, in Eden Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana Co., the court upheld a
punitive damages award where out-of-state conduct helped cause plaintiffs injury. 2 18 The court rejected defendant's argument that it was
punished for out-of-state conduct.2 1 9 The court reasoned that the outof-state conduct at issue furthered the fraudulent misrepresentation
2 20
within Iowa which was the subject of plaintiffs suit.
2.

Out-of-State Conduct with Dual Use: Plaintiffs Cause of Action
and Reprehensibility

Boyd was, essentially, an easy case. A more difficult situation was
presented in White v. Ford Motor Co., from which the fact pattern that
begins this article is derived. 221 The procedural history of White temporally straddles Campbell: the first trial and initial appeal preceded
Campbell. The decision of most interest comes after the Ninth Circuit
vacated the punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial to
determine the value of punitive damages.2 2 2
In White, the plaintiffs' child died when a Ford truck rolled away
and ran over him because the parking brake failed to hold it in place
after the truck was taken out of gear.2 2 3 At trial, plaintiffs introduced
considerable evidence of other parking brake failures and roll-away
accidents.2 2 4 The evidence was relevant to demonstrate defectiveness
and Ford's notice of the defect in order to bolster plaintiffs' defect and
failure to warn/recall claims. 2 25 The out-of-state evidence was also
used to demonstrate malice as a prerequisite to punitive damages
under Nevada law.22 6 Plaintiffs' counsel made an emotional appeal for
a considerable punitive damages award based on Ford's nationwide
218. 370 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2004) (involving bad-faith and misrepresentation in a
distributorship agreement), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1518 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005)
(No. 04-802).
219. Id. at 827.
220. Id. at 829.
221. 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1002-04.
224. Id. at 1003-04.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1011-12.
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conduct, and urged an award impressive enough to alter Ford's conduct nationwide.2 2 7
The Ninth Circuit, in a prescient pre-Campbell decision, applied
Gore and held that it was error to permit the jury to punish Ford for
out-of-state conduct. 2 28 The Ninth Circuit conceded that out-of-state
conduct was relevant on the issue of reprehensibility. 22 9 The court recognized that the distinction between reprehensibility and punishment
would often be difficult for juries to put into practice:
In some cases the distinction between using the evidence as it bears on
reprehensibility but not as a measure of damages might be so gossamer
as to be difficult for a jury to apply, but in others the significance of the
distinction will be quite clear. For example, where the jury wants to
punish a national manufacturer for something it did nationally, it
might well be tempted to multiply the appropriate amount of punitive
damages for one plaintiff by the number of hypothetical plaintiffs the
jury thinks likely to be harmed. That can't be done, under BMW,
where the °award would thereby include amounts based on out-of-state
victims.

23

On remand (post-Campbell) the district court faced numerous
motions regarding the scope of trial, which was to be held solely to
determine the value of punitive damages.23 1 Defendant moved to prohibit argument asking the jury to punish it for "vehicle sales or accidents occurring outside of Nevada or, more generally, for vehicle sales
or accidents affecting individuals who are not parties to this case. "232
On this motion, the court read Campbell's deliberateness and culpability exception to permit consideration of such evidence on the issue of
reprehensibility.2 3 3
The defendant also moved, in a separate motion, to exclude testimony of a Pennsylvania woman whose child was injured in a similar
roll-away accident. 2 34 Plaintiffs intended to introduce the Pennsylvania
227. Id. at 1015 ("The entire thrust of the argument was that this Nevada jury now
should vindicate the interests of all Ford truck owners everywhere with a verdict that
would make the front page of every newspaper in the country, so that the chief
executive officer and other top officers of Ford Motor Company would '[pour] out of
their chairs like water and [crumple] on the floor."').
228. Id. at 1019-20.
229. Id. at 1016 n.69.
230. Id.
231. White v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV-N-95-0279-DWH, 2003 WL 23353600, at *13 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2003). Liability for failure to warn and for punitive damages was
resolved against Ford in the previous trial.
232. Id. at *16.
233. Id.

234. Id. at *18.
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mother's testimony of her child's injuries.2 35 Plaintiffs indicated her
testimony was "necessary to give the new jury an appreciation of the
oppressive and malicious nature of Ford's conduct. '23 6 The court
noted that such evidence was relevant to the issue of reprehensibility,
but had concerns about its probative value versus its prejudicial damage.237 Consequently, the court denied defendant's motion, but indicated it would rule on objections when the testimony was offered. 2 38
Ford also objected to introduction of evidence of a subsequent
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recall of the
parking brake, as well as Ford's response to other accidents and injuries.23 9 The court noted that the NHTSA recall, unlike the facts in
Campbell, involved precisely the same kind of harm that injured the
decedent.240 The court also observed that Ford was planning to use its
own actions in other accidents in mitigation of its reprehensibility:
Reasoning that the plaintiffs ought to be on a level playing field, and
allowed to rebut this evidence, the court admitted the NHSTA recall.2 4 '
Generally, the court's approach in White is sound: Ford's design
process, notice of problems, and notice that these problems were
resulting in serious injuries and death were all relevant to demonstrate
the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct in failing to warn.2 4 2 Similar
accidents resulting from this failure to warn have a nexus to plaintiffs'
harm because notice of these accidents forms the basis of a failure to
recall claim. Additionally, similar accidents are, by definition, sufficiently similar to be considered under recidivism. The court permitted
evidence of dissimilar accidents and Ford's response thereto only in
243
rebuttal, should Ford decide to introduce such evidence.
The court erred in two respects. First, it erred in misconstruing
Ford's request that plaintiffs not argue that it be punished for other
accidents, including out-of-state activity. 2 44 The court construed this
235. Id. at *19.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at *20, 22.
240. Id. at *21.
241. Id. at *21, 22.
242. The jury in White found design defect, but that it did not proximately cause the
accident. The Ninth Circuit struggled with this apparent inconsistency, but ultimately
held that the jury could find that the defect did not proximately cause the accident,
even if the failure to warn of a known defect did. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d
998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). '
243. White, 2003 WL 23353600, at *22.
244. Id. at *16-17.
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as a blanket request that all out-of-state conduct be excluded, an
impression Ford might have fostered by over-arguing the point. Ford
was correct in arguing that Campbell clearly states that out-of-state
conduct may not be used to punish a defendant. 245 Out-of-state evidence admitted to demonstrate deliberateness and culpability must be
accompanied by an instruction prohibiting its use for punishment (for
whatever good that will serve).246 Since White was remanded because
out-of-state evidence was used as a basis for punishment, the court was
vigilant in ensuring plaintiffs were not permitted to argue that Ford
247
should be punished for its nationwide activities.
Second, Ford attempted to stipulate to the facts to which the Pennsylvania mother would testify. 248 Ford argued that if it did so her testi-

mony would be cumulative and therefore unduly prejudicial and not
probative. 249 The court dismissed this argument. While it expressed a
willingness to rule upon objections at trial, it ought to have been more
245. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
246. Id. Fortunately the liability for the underlying cause of action was already
resolved in the second White trial. The court therefore did not have to weigh the
relevance of out-of-state conduct to punitive damages in relation to its value to the
underlying cause of action. Were liability still at issue, the court would still be
required to take measures to ensure that the jury was not unduly prejudiced, but these
measures would be limited given plaintiffs' right to put on comprehensive proof going
to liability. Such a case would be a good candidate for bifurcation. See infra Part V C
for a discussion of how bifurcation could be employed in such a case.
247. The court's jury instructions on retrial indicate that it sought to ensure that the
jury's verdict comported with Campbell. See Transcript of Jury Instructions, White v.
Ford Motor Co., No. CV-N-95-0279-DWH, 2004 WL 856525 (D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2004)
("While the amount of punitive damages to be awarded lies within your discretion, the
amount awarded must not exceed the amount that you find the plaintiffs have proved,
by a preponderance of the evidence, is reasonably required to vindicate Nevada's
legitimate interest in punishment and deterrence, if any. In determining the amount of
punitive damages, if any, reasonably required to vindicate Nevada's legitimate interest
in punishment and deterrence, you may not add damages to protect people or to
punish harm to people outside of Nevada. However, you may consider defendant's
out-of-state conduct in determining the reprehensibility, deliberateness, or culpability
of the defendant in the acts for which it has been found liable in this case, provided
that the out-state-conduct is both connected to and similar to the specific harm
suffered by the plaintiffs."). Whether or not the jury took these instructions to heart is
uncertain. After retrial, the jury returned a verdict for $52 million in punitive
damages. See Parking Brakes: Nevada Jury Awards $52 Million in Punitives After
Remand, ANDREWS AUTO. LITIG. REPORTER, Apr. 6, 2004 at 2. This was, however, a
significant reduction from the $150 million in punitive damages awarded by the first
jury. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002).
248. White v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV-N-95-0279-DWH, 2003 WL 23353600, at *18
(D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2003).
249. Id.
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sensitive to Campbell's repeated admonitions that a trial court must
vigilantly guard against jury passion, bias, and caprice. 250 The Court
stated in Campbell: "Vague instructions, or those that merely inform
the jury to avoid passion or prejudice, do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence that
is relevant and evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory. '"251
The Court in Campbell expressed a repeated concern that a defendant
be punished only for the wrong at issue.
Campbell's purpose was to establish a gatekeeping function that
courts appear somewhat reluctant to fully embrace. In light of these
concerns, the White district court's reluctance to exclude what could
only have been inflammatory testimony of the Pennsylvania mother
was questionable.
Demonstrative of Campbell's impact in a discovery dispute, the
court in Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., an insurance bad-faith
termination case, generally affirmed a magistrate discovery order
denying defendant insurance company's motions for protective
orders. 252 The plaintiff in Saldi sought, inter alia, broad discovery of
defendant's business practices to demonstrate a broad and extensive
pattern and plan to terminate benefits under similar policies.253 The
defendant objected to this discovery, relying in part on Campbell's
prohibitions of dissimilar and out-of-state conduct. 25 4 The court

rejected this argument: where it is alleged that defendant's bad faith
policy applied to plaintiff to terminate benefits, "the plaintiff is entitled
to discover and ultimately present evidence of that policy or practice at
trial in order to prove that the insurer intentionally injured the plaintiff
and to show the insurer's reprehensibility and recidivism ....
255
Saldi noted that Campbell permitted out-of-state conduct to prove deliberateness and culpability.25 6 The court reasoned that defendant's policies and practices could produce evidence to counter defendant's
2 57
proffered reasons for denying plaintiffs disability claim.
The court limited in several respects plaintiffs request for information regarding defendant's involvement in bad-faith litigation to
demonstrate reprehensibility and recidivism. 258 The court limited dis250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418.
Id.
224 F.R.D. 169, 172 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 196.
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covery to only such cases involving the same unit in Pennsylvania that
terminated plaintiffs benefits, during the same time plaintiff was
25 9
requesting benefits, and involving the same kind of policy.

Out-of-state conduct similar to plaintiffs harm was found to have
the requisite nexus in Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Industries.2 6 °
In Diesel Machinery, a claim for wrongful termination of dealerships,
the court rejected defendant's objection to admission of evidence of
out-of-state conduct, namely identical termination of dealerships.2 6 '
The court reasoned that this identical out-of-state conduct "proved that
the conduct was not an isolated occurrence, and it demonstrated that
it was intentional as opposed to a mere accident. All of these factors
are relevant to the reprehensibility analysis. 2 6 2
The Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to infer from Campbell
profound limitations of out-of-state conduct in bad faith actions. In
Hangarterv. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit
affirmed punitive damages of $5 million on $2.6 million in compensatory damages in a claim alleging wrongful termination of disability
benefits.2 6 3 As in Saldi, the plaintiff alleged that her disability benefits
were wrongfully terminated under a policy designed to target expensive claims and use biased medical examiners to deny benefits.2 6 4 The
Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the facts in Hangarter from
Campbell, first by asserting that the out-of-state conduct in Campbell
was lawful, and second, by asserting that the conduct at issue in Hangarter bore a sufficient nexus to plaintiffs harm, as it was companywide, and not "scant," as the Court claimed was the case in
2 65
Campbell.
The Ninth Circuit probably did not need to distinguish itself from
Campbell to support its holding affirming punitive damages. In doing
so, its careless treatment of Campbell provides fodder for misuse. First,
Campbell did not involve only lawful out-of-state conduct. 26 6 There is
no substantial difference between the out-of-state conduct in Han259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
328 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.S.D. 2003).
Id. at 1054.
Id.
373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004).

264. Id. at 1011.
265. Id. at 1015 n.11 ("Moreover, the defendant's out-of-state conduct in State Farm,
which was legal in the jurisdiction where it occurred, bore little relation to the
plaintiffs harm.").
266. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) ("Here,
the Campbells do not dispute that much of the out-of-state conduct was lawful where it
occurred." (emphasis added)).
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garter and Campbell: both cases involved an alleged company-wide policy that used unethical means to reduce and deny valid claims. The
Hangarter court preposterously concluded the out-of-state conduct
there at issue was uniformly illegal but similar out-of-state conduct in
Campbell was perfectly legal. Further, the lawful/unlawful distinction
upon which the Hangartercourt relied is facetious. It is difficult to
imagine why there should be a distinction between lawful and unlawful conduct: both may be equally relevant to deliberateness and culpability. That the focus of Campbell was substantially lawful conduct
does not give courts carte blanche to admit unlawful conduct any more
than it prohibits unlawful conduct with the requisite nexus.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the out-of-state conduct in
Hangarterbore a sufficient nexus to the plaintiffs harm is wanting.
Distinguishing Hangarterfrom Campbell's "scant" evidence, the Ninth
Circuit notes "evidence presented in this case indicates that
'
The Ninth
[d]efendants' challenged policies were company-wide."267
Circuit clearly did not read Campbell. The challenged policies at issue
in Campbell were also company-wide. 268 Campbell discussed such
company-wide policies and practices in far greater detail than did the
Ninth Circuit in Hangarter. The "scant" evidence in Campbell was
"scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them"
to demonstrate recidivism.269 It was not "scant" evidence of a company-wide policy. The company-wide policy in Campbell was deemed
"dissimilar" and "independent" from the acts upon which liability was
premised and "bore no relation to the Campbells' harm. '270 The Court
in Campbell reached this conclusion of dissimilarity and independence
despite the clear causal relationship between the company-wide policies and plaintiffs' harm.
To be fair, Campbell offers little guidance as to the requisite nexus
of out-of-state conduct to demonstrate deliberateness and culpability.
It does the law a disservice, however, to pretend the Court in Campbell
did not find ample evidence of company-wide misconduct lacking, and
to further pretend the Court did not prohibit punishment for such con-

267.
268.
269.
270.

Hangarter,373 F.3d at 1015 n.11.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 432-33.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 422.
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duct that it held to be dissimilar and unrelated. 2 7 1 A more honest analysis of Campbell is required to do justice to its guiding principles.272
V.

SOME CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT

The Saldi court's argument, in permitting discovery relating to a
corporate policy and practice resulting in bad-faith termination of benefits, has intuitive appeal. Following TXO's reasoning, a plaintiff ought
to be permitted to introduce evidence to rebut a defendant's "honest
mistake" defense. Additionally, a plaintiff should be able to argue that
it was not an honest mistake by proving that the defendant, through its
policy, frequently engages in such conduct. Such evidence would be
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as prior acts relevant to intent.273 Similarly, where notice is relevant to plaintiffs claim,
as in White where plaintiff alleged failure to warn of a known defect,
the floodgates for out-of-state evidence are opened. Intent and notice
are avenues to introduce out-of-state evidence not only through plaintiffs case in chief but also through Campbell's deliberateness and culpability exception. So applied, however, the exception threatens to
devour the rule.
Campbell's Uncertain Scope Regarding Out-of-State Conduct: The
Requisite Nexus and Problems with Dual Use Evidence
Campbell, despite its repeated criticism that the trial court was a
venue "to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State
Farm's operations throughout the country," offers little factual mortar
to defense attorneys to plug the dam.2 74 The Court did not expressly
state what evidence was or was not permissible to demonstrate deliberateness and culpability. Campbell's oblique exception for conduct that
no well defined borders: must
has a "nexus to the specific harm"27 has
5
A.

the conduct have a causal nexus?

271. Id. at 422-23 ("A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A
defendant should be punished for conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an
unsavory individual or business.").
272. This is not to say that Hangarter cannot be reconciled with Campbell. My
criticism is that in misrepresenting Campbell the Ninth Circuit creates authority for the
incorrect assertion that a company-wide policy which injures a plaintiff may come in
and be used to punish a defendant without limitation, on the false basis that Campbell
did not involve a "company-wide" policy and is therefore non-controlling.
273. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
274. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 409.
275. Id. at 409-10.
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The greatest analysis is found in the Court's discussion of recidivism, where the pre-requisite for admissibility is that the other conduct
"replicate the conduct at issue. '2 76 However, this analysis raises more
questions than it answers. Rather than describe sufficiently similar
conduct, the Court merely discusses various dissimilarities, namely:
the lack of similarity between prior wrongdoings and the conduct at
issue (scant evidence of third party lawsuits); evidence of State Farm's
investigation into employees' personal lives and evidence of State
Farm's corruptive practices, which the Court criticized as tangential;
and the harmful effects on the market resulting from State Farm's
unfair competitive advantage gained through under-paying claims,
which the Court dismissed as irrelevant.2 7 7 With respect to the socalled "Performance, Planning and Review" policy, which plaintiffs
argued embodied a company-wide scheme to "meet corporate fiscal
goals by capping payouts on claims company-wide," the Court does
not expressly hold whether such evidence is admissible under its
deliberateness and culpability exception.2 78 Stating what is not similar
does not quite establish what is sufficiently similar.
By only admitting prior litigation involving termination of benefits under similar policies, the Saldi court improved upon the trial
court in Campbell, where there was no such limitation to bad-faith failure to settle third-party lawsuits. Such a limitation is ultimately arbitrary, however.
A broader corporate policy which results in injury through denial
of benefits logically has a "nexus" to plaintiffs harm and may be
admissible under a fair reading of the Court's holding.2 7 9 Saldi does a
commendable job resolving Campbell's imprecision. It fashioned a rule
that balances Campbell's concerns regarding federalism and duplication of punishment with plaintiffs right to obtain evidence to support
its case in chief as well as to demonstrate deliberateness, culpability,
and recidivism. While such evidence may be admissible, Campbell
strongly implies that courts serve a gatekeeping function by taking a
narrow view of duplicative evidence of other acts that tends to invite
punishment for all a defendant's misdeeds.

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 423.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 415.
See id.at 436-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Punishment Prohibited:A Jury May Not Send a National Message,
or Base its Punitive Damages Verdict on Out-of-State Evidence

What is clearly prohibited by Campbell is that a plaintiff cannot
seek punishment of a defendant for out-of-state conduct directly
through multipliers or some other benchmark for calculating damages. 28 0 Nor may a plaintiff use magic words requesting punishment

for nationwide conduct or to change the way a defendant acts in other
jurisdictions.
This does not mean that creative lawyering cannot achieve the
same results. Jury instructions provide some assistance, but a defense
attorney walks on eggshells when damaging evidence of out-of-state
conduct is admitted because requesting an instruction at the time of its
admission risks drawing undue attention to the evidence as well as
confusing the jury. Moreover, even if plaintiffs' attorneys cannot use
the magic words of "punishment" or "message sending" with respect to
nationwide conduct, they may still present copious amounts of out-ofstate conduct under the reprehensibility prong, as well as to establish
liability. Defense attorneys must be vigilant to prevent this from
becoming a parade of out-of-state conduct designed to invite the jury
to punish. Weeping mothers from other states should not be allowed
to testify about their children's deaths, as the court in White was prepared to admit.
C.

How Defense and Plaintiffs' Attorneys Can Use Campbell:
Opening and Closing the Floodgates of Out-of-State Conduct

As an evidentiary holding, defense attorneys can argue Campbell
limits evidence on the issues of deliberateness and culpability to causal
conduct or harm similar to that which injured the plaintiff (where such
evidence is relevant to notice or intent). This limitation is supported
by examination of State Farm's conduct in Campbell which the Court
noted supported punitive damages. All of the conduct cited by the
Court as demonstrating State Farm's reprehensibility bore a close
causal relationship to plaintiff's harm. 2 8 ' This limitation is also justi280. See Sand Hill Energy Inc. v. Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153, 164-65 (Ky. 2004);
Lockyer v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 347-48 (2004).
281. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). See
discussion of State Farm's conduct supra Part III B-C. In holding that State Farm's

conduct merited some measure of punitive damages, the Court cited only conduct
which proximately affected the plaintiffs: State Farm altered company records to make
plaintiff less culpable (falsely bolstering a claim that it could defend the lawsuit and
need not settle); disregarded the high likelihood of liability and near-certain
probability of a judgment in excess of policy limits; and falsely assured the plaintiffs

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2005

41

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:63

fied, as in Saldi, by balancing Campbell's policy interests discussed
above.
With respect to conduct offered to demonstrate deliberateness,
culpability, as well as recidivism, a Rule 403 exclusion may be appropriate. 2 s 2

Cumulative, though relevant, out-of-state conduct may be

excludable because of the risk that such conduct will be used to punish the defendant. In White, for example, the jury could have been
educated that Ford knew about the emergency brake failures and their
consequences, without hearing an out-of-state mother's emotional testimony describing her child's injuries.28 3
Plaintiffs' attorneys appear constrained by causal and similarity
requirements with respect to the deliberateness and culpability exception. In a bad-faith case, plaintiffs should argue that broad categories
of harm were permitted in TXO to support plaintiff's cause of action
and rebut a good-faith defense.28 4 A distinction between conduct relevant to a plaintiff's underlying claim and conduct permissible for punitive damages on that claim is difficult to fairly adjudicate. This
argument offers a court some flexibility with regard to Campbell's
vague holding and the means to permit virtually unlimited acts tending to show lack of mistake. Excluding dissimilar out-of-state conduct
on the issue of deliberateness and culpability forces a court to hold
that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled TXO to the extent TXO
permitted an enhancement of reprehensibility based on dissimilar outof-state conduct. Plaintiffs' attorneys are undermined by Campbell's
clear implications: a great deal of related out-of-state evidence was
rejected because the Court concluded it was dissimilar and bore no
relation to the plaintiffs' harm.
Plaintiffs' attorneys find stronger ground on the issue of whether
out-of-state conduct may be used to demonstrate recidivism. Nowhere
in Campbell does the Court state that out-of-state conduct is not relevant to recidivism. Defense attorneys must craft an argument that may
prove too policy-based to satisfy trial and appellate courts, in the
absence of specific language from the Supreme Court. Indeed, distinguishing recidivist evidence from deliberateness and culpability may
seem like getting angels to dance on pinheads. Here TXO offers some
inertia against defense attorneys' argument: To exclude out-of-state
evidence on the issue of recidivism, a court must hold that TXO, which
their assets were safe, only to later tell them post-judgment that they should put a "for
sale" sign on their house. Id.
282. FED. R. EvIo. 403.
283. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002).
284. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
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permitted out-of-state evidence on the issue of punitive damages generally, is no longer good law, or at least not controlling.
Because of the dual use of bad-faith and notice evidence with
respect to a plaintiff's cause of action and claim for punitive damages,
defense attorneys are strongly urged to request bifurcation. The argument for limiting out-of-state evidence in a punitive damages phase is
much stronger than when a plaintiff is also attempting to prove the
underlying cause of action. This permits defense attorneys to limit
TXO's holding with respect to punitive damages, as TXO was a preCampbell decision that focused on a traditional evidentiary argument
without any examination of the federalist implications.
Because much of the proof of liability and punitive damages overlap, it may be advisable to impanel two juries with one solely to determine punitive damages. The punitive damages jury could then be
excused during presentation of prejudicial out-of-state evidence, saving the expense of fully bifurcating a trial. This would be conducted in
much the same fashion as a multi-defendant criminal trial where separate juries are empanelled for each defendant. The jury for defendant
A is excused when evidence is introduced against defendant B, but is
irrelevant to defendant A and would only serve to prejudice defendant
A.
D.

Conclusion: The Role of Out-of-State Conduct After Campbell

The Court's analysis in Campbell is laden with concerns of constitutional magnitude. Rather than a trite effort at tort reform, Campbell
is predicated on such constitutional concerns of federalism, notice,
and fundamental fairness. With respect to the magnitude of punitive
damages, it concluded that the wild days of $100 million punitive damages upon million dollar compensatory awards were over. The Court
was particularly concerned that civil cases, principally designed to settle private disputes, should not serve as a rough substitute for the
proper vehicle for the state to vindicate its punitive interest. A defenis simply not afforded the protections of a crimidant in a civil action
2 85
proceeding.
nal

Campbell is clear that punitive damages may not serve to punish a
defendant for out-of-state conduct. Federalism thus trumps the public's interest in deterrence. The Court does not address any concern
that this rule may result in under-deterrence. The Court does not
come close to engaging in any law and economics analysis. To the
Court, federalism and the risk of duplicative punishment rule the day.
285. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
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Lower courts should take heed of Campbell's constitutional implications. These implications have practical effect: an examination of
State Farm's out-of-state conduct that the Court rejected as irrelevant
is breathtaking in its scope. A pervasive company-wide plan which
resulted in the deliberate bad-faith mishandling of plaintiffs' case was
deemed irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages. In this sense,
Campbell may be interpreted as a reaction to what the Court perceives
as an epidemic of anti-corporate campaigns in the form of punitive
damages actions. It presents a new battlefield for litigants to contest
the scope of actions against large defendants. A court must consider
Campbell carefully to ensure that cases do not turn into broad indictments of a defendant's misdeeds, while at the same time ensuring that
a plaintiff may present his case in chief and demonstrate the reprehensibility of the defendant's acts.
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